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Hemphill: Criminal Law and Procedure
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
ROBMRT

W.

HMPHILL*

For the 1956 Survey we have followed the pattern of the 1955
Survey insofar as practical application would permit, endeavoring to
include: (1) Substantive Criminal Law, (2) Criminal Procedure,
(3) Acts of the General Assembly, 1955, having a direct bearing on
the criminal practice, and (4) a review of other matters pertinent to
the practice of Criminal Law.
I.

CRIMINAL LAW

SUBSTANTIVEI

Fraudulent Check -

Bankruptcy

1

In State v. T. I. Sutton in reaffirming the necessity of fraudulent intent as an element necessary for conviction under the bogus
check law,2 the court also restated that the failure of the defendant
to pay the check within seven days after written notice of dishonor
raised the presumption of fraudulent intent, and, upon the presumption being raised by the written notice and the time passage, an issue
was made for the trial jury as to fraudulent intent. The court reversed the conviction because the trial Judge excluded defendant's
evidence that, subsequent to the giving of the check and prior to written notice to him under the Statute, defendant was adjudicated
Bankrupt. The court said that our court does not go as far as a
cited Georgia decision 3 that Bankruptcy was an absolute defense,
but if the Bankruptcy occurred before the written notice, evidence
of such was competent to go to the jury as tending to negative the
statutory presumption of fraudulent intent.
Violation of Liquor Law -

Constructive Possession

In State v. Little-johnl referred to in the 1955 Survey, a conviction of defendant for unlawfully possessing alcoholic liquors was
reversed, and a verdict of acquittal ordered, on the grounds that the
constructive possession by defendant was not sufficiently proved. The
State's testimony was that the defendant owned the building where
his cafe business was carried on on the first floor; the second floor of
C OSolicitor,

Sixth South Carolira Judicial Circuit; Member firm Hemphill & Hemphill,
nwiter, S C
Member General Assembly 1947-1948; Member Chester County, South
Carolina and American Bar Associations.

1. 228 S.C. 314, 89 S.E. 2d 874 (1955).

2. CODr OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 8-176 and 8-178.
3. 27 Ga. App. 177, 107 S.E. 885 (1921).
4. 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E. 2d 924 (1955).
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the building was being used by employee-tenant as a residence. The
liquor was on the second floor but the owner was charged with the
possession. The circumstantial evidence thus relied on for proof of
constructive possession was held as insufficient, as second floor occupant was bona fide tenant.
Rape- Penetration- Lesser Offense
In State v. Collins5 the court clarified the questions which were
raised in State v. Henderson.6 In the Henderson case, the court inferred, that where there was testimony by the prosecuting witness
and by the defendant, that penetration had occurred, that the only
question left for the court's consideration would be the question of
rape or no rape. In the Collins case both the prosecuting witness
and the defendants testified that there was penetration and the jury
having had submitted to it all three counts of an indictment charging rape, assault with intent to ravish, and assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature. The jury convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The court held, however, that
the fact of penetration was insufficient to negative the lesser offense
where there was evidence upon which a jury could make a finding
that the prosecutrix did not consent to prior acts of defendants, prior
to the admitted penetration, which prior acts constituted assault of
a high and aggravated nature. The court went on to say that if the
female resists for a time but finally consents to intercourse, the man
may be guilty of assault with intent to commit rape. This, in effect,
states, that where there is an issue of fact as to the resistance of the
victim to any alleged attack, the mere fact that both parties admit
penetration, is not sufficient to wipe the slate clean as to the prior
assault, and that the counts of assault with intent to ravish and assault
and battery of a high and aggravated nature, are proper in the indictment, and properly submitted to the jury, where the facts indicate
resistance on the part of the female. It may be inferred that the
resistance must be of some consequence, and not token resistance.
Rape -Elements

Restated

7

In State v. Whitener the court re-emphasized the elements of
what the profession generally knows as common law rape and statutory rape, the former being generally considered a forceful commission of the crime, and the latter being predicated more on age of
consent rather than actual force. Both of these crimes are now well
5. 228 S.C. 537, 91 S.E. 2d 259 (1956).
6. 226 S.C. 227, 84 S.E. 2d 626 (1954).

7. 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.R. 2d 701 (1955).
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defined in our statutes.8 If the female of age consents, there is no
rape, and this case is further authority for the fact that generally,
to constitute rape, force on the part of the male and resistance on
the part of the female are necessary ingredients as indicative of nonconsent. However, force may be actual or constructive, and the degree of force and resistance required to characterize the act as rape
must of necessity vary with the circumstances of the particular case.
Sexual intercourse with a woman unconscious or insane was defined
as rape, neither force nor resistance being necessary under such circumstances. Generally, the issue of force and the issue of consent
are for the jury.
Where, however, the female is below the statutory age of consent,
neither force nor consent are necessary, and this offense, generally
known as statutory rape, is predicated upon two material elements
of the crime, to-wit: carnal knowledge, or sexual intercourse with a
female, and, a female below the age of consent, and where the female
is below the age of consent, the only material elements to the crime
are carnal knowledge and the age of the female.
In this case, the state was allowed to submit evidence of an unnatural sexual act committed upon the prosecutrix some hours after
the original offense. The court stated that while it was true as a
general rule that in a trial for one crime testimony for other and distinct crimes is not admissible, an exception is made where such testimony tends to establish a common scheme or plan embracing the
commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establish the others. Such exception is generally
applied in cases involving sexual crimes, where evidence of acts prior
and subsequent to the act charged in the indictment is held admissible
as tending to show continued illicit intercourse between the same
parties, citing State v. Ritchie.9
Homicide-

Self Defense

The case of State v. Henry Jackson'0 is a case in which appellant
was convicted of the murder of a policeman in appellant's own home.
The question on appeal was whether an instruction on self-defense
was proper. The testimony of appellant was that he had ridden in
a cab to his home, partially intoxicated, went in to get the money
to pay the cab-driver but was unable to get the money and so he did
not go back out of his home; the taxi driver knocked on the door
8. CODI: or LAWS OP SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 16-71 and 16-80.
9. 88 S.C. 239, 70 S.E. 729 (1911).
10. 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E. 2d 681 (1955).
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but received no response; later the taxi driver, accompanied by a
policeman, came to appellant's home, without a warrant. Appellant
testified that he woke up and that a companion told him somebody
was out there and he heard his mother say, "Whoever that is, don't
try to tear my door down." He got his gun and when a flashlight
shined in his face he shot at the light and then heard a body fall,
picked up the flashlight and found out it was a policeman. The
testimony was conflicting on this point. The trial judge ruled that
there was no element of self-defense requiring instruction, but the
Supreme Court ruled that if the defendant believed he was in eminent
danger, that it was not necessary that he was actually in such danger
because he had the right to act upon appearances, and under the circumstances, as they appeared to him. If he believed he was in such
danger and a reasonable, prudent man of ordinary firmness and
courage would have entertained the same belief, then he had a right
to rely upon that element of self defense. The fact that the man
was at home, or within his curtilage, and there was no arrest warrant, and the door was forced, were facts bearing on issues in the
case. The court also ruled that appellant in defending his person
from an unlawful entry or arrest had the right to use so much force
as was apparently necessary to accomplish his deliverance and no
more, and whether the arrest was unlawful or not was a question
of fact for the jury.
II.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURIE AND EVIDENc"

Confessions -

Evidence -

Corroboration

In the 1955 Survey"' we discussed confessions, in connection with
the Fifth Amendment and discussed confessions generally. The
trend has not materially changed, and this may be by virtue of the
fact that in the more serious cases, the officers are want to take some
statement from the defendant, or from the witnesses, when, in cases
of lesser importance, this practice is not followed. With the passage
of time, we find confessions attack more and more by defense counsel, in order to exhaust every nook and cranny of the law in behalf
of the accused, particularly in murder cases. Our Supreme Court,
in keeping with in acknowledged dedication to protect the defendant's rights, especially in capital cases, has gratifyingly considered
2
every objection made on appeal where the death penalty is involved.'
In State v. Fuller'3 the accused was tried for murder; he did not
11. 8 S.C.L.Q. 1 (1955).
12. 227 S.C. 138, 87 S.E. 2d 287 (1955).
13. See Note 12, supra.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss1/7

4

Hemphill: Criminal Law and Procedure

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTEiY

[Vol. 9

testify; the court did not instruct that his failure to testify should
not be considered against him, but did instruct the jury that they
could take into consideration, whether or not there had been any
contradiction of any material testimony (part of which was a confession) or witness by testimony of any other witness. Upon appeal,
from the conviction for murder, such charge was held to be prejudicial error, as the court stated that the charge on the question of
contradiction, directed the attention of the jury to defendant's failure
to testify just as surely as if the trial Judge had mentioned the defendant by name, and that the court was strengthened in that conclusion by the trial Judge's failure to charge that the defendant's
failure to testify should not be considered against him and no inference of guilt should be implied therefrom. This raised the question
which has been of practical moment to those in the criminal trial
pit for many years. Is any comment on the failure of the defendant
to testify, prejudicial to him, by directing attention to him? If the
court directs the attention to his failure to testify, does this not
violate his immunity?
The Fuller case reaffirmed the admeasurements of a voluntary
confession.
In State v. James Eugene Sinith14 it was ruled that a confession
or confessions may partake of many forms, such as a statement of
one's own part in the crime, a series of questions and answers, or a
letter or letters to one or more persons, or it may consist of detached conversations with many people; it may be a formal confession
or all or part of these together so long as it or they come direct from
the one charged with the commission of the crime. Appellant, upon
conviction, imputed error to the trial court in admitting an oral
confession (without copy being given to defendant) made by the
defendant on Sunday, when a written confession, in accordance with
the statute (with copy given to defendant) was made on Monday.
Both confessions were allowed, the oral and the written.
The case was remanded for a new trial because on the question
of contradiction or corroboration, the trial Judge charged that the
jury "shall" take into consideration whether or not there had been
any corroboration, instead of using the words that the jury "may"
take same into consideration.
In State v. William Jenkins'5 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Subsequent to the homicide, he gave a statement to the
officers which statement was introduced by the prosecution. Subse14. 227 S.C. 400, 88 S.E. 2d 345 (1955).
15. 228 S.C. 12, 88 S.E. 2d 770 (1955).
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quent to that introduction, the State went on to prove the falsity of
part of the defendant's statement. The defense took the position
that the State was bound by all that was contained in the statement
and had no right to prove by direct or circumstantial evidence the
falsity of the statement, which was in the nature of a combination
confession and self-serving declaration. In upholding the trial Judge's
refusal of the motion for a directed verdict, the Supreme Court explained the right of the prosecution to attack exculpatory statements
contained in a confession or an admission introduced by the prosecution, saying it was a question of fact for the jury, and the jury
could believe a part of the statement and disbelieve another part.
In State v. Chasteen1 6 the court reiterated the necessity of a free
and voluntary confession and said that the question of whether confession is voluntary is one which is addressed to the court in the
first instance, and if there is an issue of fact as to the voluntariness
of the confession it should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The court also went on to say that the better practice
is for the trial Judge to conduct a preliminary inquiry in the absence
of the jury, but if the confession is finally determined to be admissible, the fact that an inquiry was conducted in the presence of the
jury would not make its introduction defective or constitute a reversible error. It would seem, from this case, that the better practice is to exclude the jury when the matter is taken up before the
court, and, if the court has determined either that the confession is
voluntary, or that it should be submitted for determination by the
jury, that the preliminary questions and answers should be repeated
in the presence of the jury. This is in keeping with the duty and responsibility of the State to give the defendant a fair and impartial
trial.
State v. Hamp Jones, Jr.17 does not precipitate any novel question;
there was some question raised in that defendant's statement was
taken down in long hand and signed by him and he was not given a
copy until the statement was transcribed on a typewriter the next
day. The court held this was sufficient in compliance with the statute
requiring a copy of a statement or confession to be given to the witness or accused making certain statement or confession. State v.
Boonei8 is a case in which the court and the jury found the confession free and voluntary and the Supreme Court refused to disturb
that decision.
16. 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E. 2d 880 (1955).
17. 228 S.C. 484, 91 S.E. 2d 1 (1956).

18. 228 S.C. 438, 90 S.E. 2d 640 (1955).
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Conduct of Counsel-Statements of Prosecuting Attorney

In State v. Shackelford'9 the court held it proper for a prosecuting attorney to comment on defendant's failure to produce witnesses
who are or would be in possession of material or relevant facts concerning the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the commission
of the crime. In State v. Chasteen,20 the defendant did not take
the stand and the prosecuting attorney stated, "Of course we will
never know exactly what happened, because he was the only one
here who could tell us, but he ain't going to tell us you know." The
trial Judge expressly instructed the jury that the defendant's failure
to take the witness stand and testify on his own behalf did not create
any presumption against him. The Supreme Court, because of such
charge and on the basis of the instructions, held that the words of
the prosecuting attorney, in making such argument, did not direct the
jury's attention to defendant's failure to take the stand, thereby commenting on his absence to do so, and even if he did, the instruction
cured the defect.
Criminal Statutes- The Effect of Codification
State v. Conally21 is unique in that it attacks certain changes made
in the compilation of the 1952 South Carolina Code of Laws. The
defendant pled guilty to having in possession alcoholic liquors which
did not have South Carolina Revenue stamps on the containers. It
was his second offense, having previously paid a fine in Oconee
Magistrate Court. He was given a sentence of eighteen months by
the trial Judge. His counsel took the position that, since, under the
Alcoholic Beverage Act of 1945, having in possession of alcoholic
liquors was an offense made punishable by a fine of not more than
$100.00 or imprisonment for not more than fifteen days, that this
should be the sentence, and that the omission of the 1952 Code to
make this provision by reference, under the penal section of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, defendant was entitled to such fine.
As it happened, in the compilation of the 1952 Code, the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act, like many other Acts, was broken down, rearranged, and otherwise changed. As a result of this change, those
sections for which there was no specific punishment, were included
in the general penal section of the Code and it was under this general
section that the defendant was sentenced. Since the Legislature had
adopted the 1952 Code, the court said that it was the intention of
19. 228 S.C. 9, 88 S.E. 2d 778 (1955).
20. See Note 16, supra.
21. 227 S.C. 507, 88 S.E. 2d 591 (1956).
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the Legislature to leave the penal provision for this violation under
the general penalty statutes, and as long as same did not exceed the
limits, were not excessive. The conviction was affirmed.
Change of Venue
In State v. Samuel Wright2 2 the defendant failed to appeal a murder conviction within ten days provided by statute. Later, on a
motion for a new trial on the grounds of after-discovered evidence,
appeal was taken within ten days after Order refusing the motion.
Thereupon counsel took the position before the Supreme Court that
the venue should have been changed originally on the grounds that
the newspaper articles from the local gazette were prejudicial. Each
juror was examined upon his voir dire to establish impartiality and
the Supreme Court said that the newspaper reports alone, in the
absence of sustaining affidavits, and in view of the voir dire examination, were insufficient to warrant a change of venue.
Sufficiency of Evidence-Accomplice
In State v. Fle;mMing 3 the Supreme Court held that a conviction
for robbery could be sustained upon the testimony of an accomplice
alone if that testimony contained proof of the elements of the crime
and the State does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accomplice did commit the crime exclusive of the confession or
testimony of the co-defendant.
Right of Accused to Have His Wife Present
In State v. Eugene SmithA the defendant was prosecuted for
murder. He made a motion for a continuance on the ground that
his wife was not present, that she had departed for a distant State
approximately one week before the trial, was duly subpoenaed as a
witness, left the State of her own volition, and she did not have funds
necessary to make the trip back. There was no showing that she
was a material witness, or in possession of facts which would possibly affect the result of the trial. Defendant relied upon the time
honored opinion of justice Watts in State v. Williamson25 to the
effect that ordinarily a person tried for a capital felony has a right
to have his wife present at the trial, and the wife has a right to be
present. The instant case, however, neasured the importance and the
necessity of her presence and stated that in the absence of a showing
22.
23.
24.
25.

223 S.C. 432, 90 S.E. 2d 492 (1955).
228 S.C. 129, 89 S.E. 2d 104 (1955).
See Note 14, supra.
115 S.C. 315, 105 S.E. 697 (1921).
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that her testimony was material to the defense, this was no grounds

for a continuance and the presence of the wife is not a necessity.
This changes a belief long held by most advocates familiar with the

criminal forum, to the effect that in a capital case, the husband had
the right to the wife's presence, whether she was a material witness

or not, for the purpose of comfort, et cetera.
Inclusion of Other Offenses in the Indictment
In State v. Whitener26 the indictment not only charged rape, but
bad three counts each charging a separate and distinct offense. Defense counsel moved to quash upon the ground that the three counts
each charged a separate and distinct offense. The court said the
rule in this State is that distinct offenses- felonies or misdemeanors
may be charged in separate counts in the same indictment, whether
growing out of the same transaction or not. If they do not grow
out of the same transaction then the prosecuting officer should be required to elect upon proper motion, but when they grow out of the
same transaction the prosecuting officer is not required to elect. This
raises another question, not novel in this State; in those cases where
the indictment charges rape of a minor under the age of sixteen, is
the prosecuting officer required to elect whether he will proceed under the Common Law Rape or Statutory Rape, or may he proceed
under both and have the jury make the decision?
III. LsGISLATIV

ACTION

Controlled-Access
Traffic Violations
Act No. 621, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, in Section 8 thereof, defines certain traffic violations as unlawful acts, anticipating the establishing of controlled access highway facilities in
South Carolina. This is of minor importance on its face, but its
bearing on future reckless homicides in automobile manslaughter cases
may be important.
Wilfully Burning- Made a Felony
By Act No. 635, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, Section 16-317 of the South Carolina Code for 1952, was amended to
make wilfully burning of the lands of another a felony, instead of a
misdemeanor, and the penalty was drastically increased.
Practice of Naturopathy-A Crime
Act No. 646, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, outlaws
the practice of Naturopathy in South Carolina, making same a mis26. See Note 7, supra.
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demeanor and with the penalty of a fine not- exceeding $500.00 or
imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both in the discretion of the
court.
Child Welfare Agency -

CriminalProvision

Act No. 659, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, makes
every agency or institution engaged in the business of receiving children for care or maintenance classify as a Child Welfare Agency,
and provides that it shall be a crime to intentionally make any false
statements to the Department of Public Welfare thereabout, and
upon conviction to be punished by a fine of not more than $100.00, or
imprisonment for not more than one year or both in the discretion
of the court.
Japanese Textiles
By Act No. 672, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, it is unlawful to sell Japanese textiles or garments made therefrom without
displaying a sign advertising "Japanese Textiles are Sold Here."
Shoplifting - Penalties Increase
Act No. 756, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, creates and
defines the offense of shoplifting as "Any person who shall wilfully
take possession of any goods, wares or merchandise offered for sale
by any store or other mercantile establishment with the intention
of converting the same to his own use without paying the purchase
price thereof shall be guilty of the offense of shoplifting". Penalties
are increased, first offense up to $300.00 fine and 6 months imprisonment or both; second offense up to $500.00 fine, 1 year imprisonment
or both; third offense -imprisonment
1 to 5 years. The Act also
creates certain presumptions.
Credit for Good Behavior-

Prison

Act No. 760, South Carolina General Assembly, 1956, drastically
changes the time given for good conduct by prisoners in South Carolina and makes other provisions thereabout.
False Statements-Insurance Companies
In an Act approved March 27, 1956, the South Carolina General
Assembly provided for punishment by a fine of not more than $2,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, for an insurance company, or any person or officer thereof or other persons subscribing to a false statement required by law.
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New Penalty

By Act approved March 17, 1956, the South Carolina General
Assembly provided that bank robbing would be a felony punishable
by life imprisonment, unless the jury recommended mercy, in which
instance the minimum punishment would be five (5) years (the
maximum forty?).
Slow Speed Driver- A Misdemeanor
By Act approved February 28, 1956, the Legislature made it unlawful for a person to drive at such a slow speed as to consistently
impede the normal and reasonable moving of traffic and gave the
Highway Department the right to determine and declare a minimum
speed limit in the parts of the Highway system.
New Liquor Law
By Section 15 of the General Appropriations Act, South Carolina
General Assembly, 1956, rewrites the old Liquor Law providing
generally for stiffer penalties, but, for some reason, penal provision
is separated from this section defining the offense or degree of offense.
Section 1 provides that it is unlawful for a person to manufacture,
store, keep, receive, have in possession, et cetera, except in accordance with the Act and provides penalty for a first offense of $600.00
or 6 months; second offense - $1,500.00 or one year; third offense
$3,000.00 or 2 years.
Section 2 of the Act declares it unlawful for a person to store
or have in possession alcoholic liquors in his place of business other
than a licensed liquor store and defines generally a place of business
as any place where merchandise is sold or offered for sale, including
places of amusement, and including residences and transportation
vehicles if any sale is made therefrom, or any outbuilding or warehouse in connection therewith. For a first offense the fine is $200.00
or 60 days; second offense $1,000.00 or 12 months; third and subsequent offenses -$2,000.00 or 2 years.
In Section 3 we find the Act as advanced a rear guard pilot. Any
person engaged in transportation as offense and provides the same
penalties as Section 1 of the Act.
Section 4 makes it an offense to purchase except from a licensed
liquor dealer, and provides penalties for a first offense of $100.00 or
30 days; second offense $200.00 or 60 days; third or subsequent offense -$300.00 or 90 days.
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Section 5 provides for having in possession non-stamped liquor
and provides the same penalties as Section 4.
Section 6 provides that any person found at any distillery was
prima facie guilty of manufacturing- punishable for a first offense
of $600.00 or 6 months; second offense $1,500.00 or 1 year; third
or subsequent offense -$3,000.00 or 2 years.
Section 7 prohibits manufacturing, selling, giving away or having
in possession any still or part of a still, and provides that unexplained
possession of any part or parts are prima facie evidence of violation
of the Act. The punishment is the same as provided for in the
manufacturing in Section 6.
Section 8 makes it a crime for any person to permit manufacture
on his premises, with the same penalties as the manufacturing provision.
Section 9 makes it unlawful to have on the premises any ingredient of the manufacture of the liquor and provides the same penalties
as the manufacturing provision.
Section 10 provides for confiscation of any vessel used in the manufacture, or recently used, or used to haul alcoholic liquor.
Section 11 prohibits the transportation in vehicles for hire, it provides for the same penalties as distilling or manufacture and confiscation of the vehicle, but exempts legal alcoholic liquors belonging
to a passenger being transported with such alcoholic liquors in the
baggage of such person or upon his or her person (and we assume
in his or her person).
Section 12 provides any person unlawfully manufacturing or assisting therein, and at the time having firearm or like weapon be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction a fine of not more than
three nor less than one year or a fine of not less than $500.00 nor
more than $1,500.00, the possession of the weapon being the crucial
element of the offense.
Section 13 provides that anybody taking seized whiskey from the
arresting and investigating officers, upon conviction, shall be punished
three months to twelve months- $500.00 to $1,500.00 or both.
Section 14 provides that any person faced with a legally executed
Search Warrant, who refuses inspection or search of the premises,
delays, hinders, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
fined not more than $200.00 or imprisonment of not more than 60
days or both, but provides that no occupied dwelling shall be searched
between sun down and sun rise.
Section 15 makes it unlawful for any minor to work as an employee
in a liquor establishment, the penalty being $100.00 or 30 days for a

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss1/7
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first offense, $200.00 or 60 days for a second offense and $300.00
or 90 days for a third offense.
Section 16 makes it unlawful to drink alcoholic beverages in any
liquor establishment, with the same penalties as Section 15.
Section 17 prohibits the sale on Sunday, Election day or during
periods proclaimed by the Governor in the interest of law and order
and the public morals of decorum. The penalty is $200.00 or 60
days for the first offense, $1,000.00 or 12 months for second offense
and $2,000.00 or 2 years for third offense.
Section 18 prohibits the advertisement of alcoholic liquors on billboards along the highway and provides for the same penalties as Section 17.
Section 28 makes it unlawful to keep, store, have in possession,
carry, ship, or transport in any vehicle, vessel or aircraft or other
channel any alcoholic liquors, unlawfully acquired or manufactured
which do not bear proper federal or South Carolina Revenue stamps.
It prohibits the sale thereof; the penalty for first offense is $600.00 or
$1,500.00 or 1 year, and for third
6 months, for second offense offense - $3,000.00 or 2 years.
This Liquor Law has other provisions not appropos to this discussion, except that Section 38 provides that sentences imposed under
provisions of the Act or any portions thereof shall not be suspended
by the trial Judge provided that a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendre that he punish by a fine or imprisonment not less than
one-half the sentence prescribed for conviction. This seems to provide that in the event of a conviction by a jury, the judge has no
choice as to sentence, but if there is a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo
contendre, which is the same thing, the judge may cut the fine or
imprisonment, or both, in half.

IV. OTHER

R-ELATED MATTERS

In Costello v. United States27 Costello was indicted for wilfully
attempting to evade income tax. The only evidence against him
were Government accountants who relied upon what is known in the
tax field as "net-worth" calculations to show that the accused had
received a much greater income than he had reported. This is hearsay testimony, and Costello contended that as such it was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The trial court and the Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to dismiss the indictment. In an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Black, the court pointed out that Grand juries could act on their own knowledge and were free to make present27. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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ments on such information as they deemed satisfactory. This is a
boon and those prosecutors having difficulty with nuisance cases,
where honkey-tonks and the like are causing nuisances, but the local
community is afraid to appear because of threat and retaliation. It
seems that if the Grand Jury believes the situation should be corrected, they can call on the solicitor to present an indictment.
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